FAA security protocols 'insufficient' at time of Aurora facility fire, investigators say

CHICAGO (WLS) -- Federal Aviation Administration investigators have determined their agency lacked the planning, training and technology to quickly respond to the takedown of a major air traffic control facility last year.

In a blink of the eye, air traffic controllers operating out of the facility in Aurora were blind; radar went down and many communications systems were cut off. All because a FAA contractor intent on suicide cut key cables and set the facility's nerve center on fire.

The fire grounded planes and people, with delays spread across 17 days.

ABC7 Eyewitness News has obtained the FAA inspector general's report. It blasts the agency for having a contingency plan "insufficient to meet the demands of restoring operations."

In fact, the contingency plan was so bad, investigators found the agency revered to an "outdated 2008 plan" just to "begin the process of restoring normal operations."

Air traffic control audio from that day one year ago reveals calm controllers doing what they could as Chicago center filled with smoke.

The air traffic control center in Aurora handles flights into and out of Chicago as well as "over" half a dozen Midwest states.

Despite it being a crucial cog in the nation's air traffic control system, the Inspector General found the FAA's plan "did not contain any procedures for transferring control of air traffic to neighboring facilities."

Early on, controllers couldn't even pick up the phone and call another FAA facility.

As for how one man could cause so much trouble? Investigators determined the FAA was too focused on the prevention of "external threats." For example: Chicago Center "lacked the controls necessary to block facility access to a contract employee no longer assigned to the facility."

The government also maintains that a back-up control center in Atlantic City, N.J. be used in emergencies - it wasn't because of "incompatible equipment."

Even after the fire was out, and the workload shifted to other facilities, the Inspector General found planes couldn't be automatically tracked; controllers had to do it by hand. Radioing the pilot for altitude and heading information, then write it down on a slip of paper before it entering it into another computer. It was so antiquated that controllers were giving take-off clearances by phone.

In a statement released Wednesday, the FAA says security has been enhanced since the sabotage of the air traffic control center in Aurora:

"The FAA has significantly increased the security of its air traffic systems to ensure that they are more resilient and less vulnerable to the type of attack that occurred at the Chicago en route center on Sept. 26, 2014. Following that event, the FAA immediately launched a 30-day review of contingency plans and security protocols for its major facilities. The agency systematically evaluated its ability to minimize the "insider threat." This included an intense analysis focusing on parts of the infrastructure where one or more points of attack have a high probability of significantly compromising air traffic operations.

"Despite the massive amount of system damage that the fire caused, the FAA was able to restore most air service to Chicago area airports within a relatively short period of time. In three days, more than 80 percent of traffic was restored at O'Hare, and more than 90 percent of traffic was restored at Midway."

As for having a backup to quickly restore capacity, that remains very much a work in progress; the FAA administrator saying repeatedly that it will take a lot more money than Washington is willing to spend.